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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
court, affirming the Board's action, declared, "[I]t is enough to
say that we are wholly without jurisdiction to review such ques-
tions." Barsky v. Board of Regents of University of New York,
305 N. Y. 89, 99, 111 N. E. 2d 222, 226 (1953). Thus, even in the
disciplinary area, the court refused to widen its scope of review.
See 3 BrLo. L. R-Fv. 56.
The declaration by the court, in the instant case, of the power
of review which it possesses over S. C. A. D. transcends the ac-
customed view of judicial review in New York. The statute setting
up this agency declares that "the court shall have the power to
grant such temporary relief of restraining order as it deems
proper, and to make and enter . . . an order enforcing, modifying,
and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part
the order of the Commission." N. Y. EXECUTIVw LAW § 298. The
court indicates that it is this statute which instigates a departure
from the ordinary type of judicial review as provided for in
C. P. A. Art. 78. However, reference to this Article reveals very
little difference, if any, in the scope of review provided therein.
It states that "the court may annul or confirm, wholly or partly,
or modify the determination reviewed, . . . and may direct appro-
priate action or inaction by the respondent (administrative
agency)." N. Y. C. P. A. Art. 78, § 1300.
It is submitted that, because of the striking similarity of
wording in the two sections, little precedent value should be placed
upon the court's declaration of its broader scope of review in the
instant case.
Viwcent A. Delorio
CRIMINAL LAW-COERCED CONFESSIONS
Defendants were convicted of murder. At their trial, confes-
sions, alleged to have been coerced, were admitted in evidence.
The question of coercion was left to the jury under the charge to
consider them only if they were found to be voluntary. Held (6-3)
affirming: (1) the jury could reasonably have found that the con-
fessions were voluntary: (2) it was not a violation of due process
for the judge to refuse to charge that the jury must acquit if it
found that the confessions were coerced. Stein v. New York, 346
U. S. 156 (1953).
The first case in which the United States Supreme Court re-
versed a state conviction involving the use of a coerced confession
held that due process, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,
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is violated when a conviction rests solely upon a confession coerced
by torture and threats. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936).
By 1944 the grounds of reversal had been broadened to the use of
confessions procured under "inherently coercive" circumstances,
including prolonged questioning without sleep. Askcraft v. Ten-
nessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944).
While the court will not weigh disputed evidence as to the
voluntary nature of a confession, Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S.
219, 238 (1941), the findings in lower courts do not preclude the
court from independently examining the undisputed evidence to
determine whether a confession was coerced. Chambers v. Florida,
309 U. S. 227, 229 (1940).
If the court finds that a confession was coerced, and it was
introduced at the trial, the judgment of conviction will be set aside
even though the evidence apart from the confession might have
been sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. Malinski v. New York,
321 U. S. 401, 404 (1945). Despite the weight of other evidence,
if the jury may have been influenced by the introduction of a
coerced confession, due process is violated and a new trial is
required. Stroble v. State of California, 343 U. S. 181, 190 (1952).
Under the New York type of procedure the jury determines
whether doubtful confessions are voluntary. In its terms the
holding of the principal case is limited to the proposition that,
where other evidence is present, a jury need not acquit if it finds
that a confession was coerced. If this position necessarily implies
that an appellate court need not reverse if it finds that a confession
was coerced, then the Malinski case is overruled. The defendant
then would have to prove that because the jury had to some extent
based their verdict on the confession its introduction was prejudi-
cial to him. With such an attenuated concept of due process pro-
secutors would be free to introduce confessions procured by
any means of coercion so long as there is also other untainted
evidence to sustain the conviction.
It is noi believed that the United. States Supreme Court will
feel bound by such logical subtleties but that it will continue to
-apply the Malinski rule.
Jules Gordon
